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Abstract— Security of satellite data is becoming an important 
issue. The DVB (TV broadcasting) Conditional Access system 
used in satellite broadcasting has however been surrounded by 
controversy for many years due to the spread of counterfeit 
smart cards, and this paper examines the weaknesses of current 
DVB-S security.  We provide an alternative solution to secure 
multicast services over satellites using IPSEC and a group key 
management system called GSAKMP. 
 
Index Terms— Security, Conditional Access, multicast, DVB-
S, DVB-RCS.  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
There probably exists no other application of satellite 
technology that is as well known as satellite broadcasting [1], 
[2].  The Digital Video Broadcasting (DVB) system has been 
designed with a modular structure, based on independent sub-
systems, so that a variety of DVB systems (such as DVB-S: 
satellite, DVB-T: terrestrial, DVB-C: cable) could maintain a 
high level of interoperability.  The challenge for the next 
generation of satellite access systems is to define a common 
basis for efficient integration of satellites in IP-centric 
telecommunication networks.  One important area of 
integration is the communication security system.  Security can 
be provided at various such satellite link level (such as DVB-S 
conditional access); or security can be provided at the network 
level such as IPSEC.  Both link and network level security have 
their strong and weak points, they can work together to provide 
a stronger security system. 
However, DVB Conditional Access (DVB CA) has been 
surrounded by controversy for many years due to the spread of 
counterfeit smart cards.  For example, in late 1999, Italy was 
flooded with cheap counterfeit cards that enabled viewers use 
Canal Plus for free [3].  In March 2002 Canal Plus Group filed 
a US federal lawsuit against rival NDS Group, accusing it of 
cracking its digital television smart cards and putting the 
confidential information on the Internet, "permitting theft of 
digital television on a massive scale" in Europe [4]. Therefore 
there is a need for a radical change in the DVB CA system. 
The work in paper is conducted within a European project 
(within the Information society Technologies, IST, 
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programme) called SATLIFE [5] that examine the new services 
and applications over an On Board Processing (OBP) satellite 
system called Amazonas.  It is based on the AMERHIS OBP 
payload developed by the European Space Agency (ESA) and 
operated by Hispasat [6].  Amazonas system integrates and 
combines both DVB-S (broadcast) and DVB-RCS (satellite 
return links) into one regenerative multi-spot satellite system. 
In this paper, we examine the current DVB-S one-way 
conditional access system and review its weaknesses; we then 
focus on network level security and providing group security 
using IPSEC and the related group management architecture in 
the IETF group called MSEC (Multicast Security) [7].  We 
present a scalable secure IP mulicast system that can used to 
secure satellite broadcast and interactive services. 
 
II. THE CURRENT DVB-S BROADCASTING (ONE-WAY) ACCESS 
CONTROL SYSTEM 
Conditional Access (CA) is a service that allows 
broadcasters to restrict certain programming products to certain 
viewers, by encrypting the broadcaster's programmes.  
Consequently, the programmes must be decrypted at the 
receiving end before they can be decoded for viewing.  CA 
offers capabilities such as pay-per-view (PPV), interactive 
features such as video-on-demand (VOD) and games, the 
ability to restrict access to certain material (sports or film 
channels, for example) and the ability to direct messages to 
specific set-top boxes (perhaps based on geographic region). 
Conditional Access used in the DVB system [8], [9], [10] 
includes three main functions: scrambling / descrambling, 
entitlement checking and entitlement management:  
• The scrambling/descrambling function aims to 
make the service incomprehensible to unauthorised 
users.  Descrambling can be achieved by any 
receiver having an appropriate descrambler and 
holding a secret Control Word (CW).  Scrambling 
can be applied to service components, either using 
a common Control Word or using separate Control 
Words for each component.  
• The entitlement checking function consists of 
broadcasting the conditions required to access a 
service, together with encrypted secret codes (the 
Control Word(s)) to enable the descrambling for 
authorised receivers. These codes are sent inside 
dedicated messages (DVB tables) called 
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 Entitlement Control Messages (ECMs) and these 
are carried in the ensemble.  
• The entitlement management function consists of 
distributing entitlements to receivers. There are 
several kinds of entitlements that match different 
means of subscribing to a service: subscription per 
theme, level or class, pre-booked pay-per-
programme or impulse pay-per-programme, per 
service or per time. This information is sent inside 
dedicated messages called Entitlement Management 
Messages (EMMs) and these may be carried in the 
same ensemble as the scrambled services or by 
some other means.  
The control and management functions (ECM and EMM) 
require the use of stronger security measures than the CW.  
Therefore secret keys and cryptographic algorithms such as 
Digital Encryption Standard (DES) are used to encrypt the 
control and management messages, while simpler scrambling 
algorithms are used to encode actual media streams using the 
CW. 
 
A. Data scrambling in DVB-S  
The CA service can scramble the programming data either at 
the Packetized Elementary Stream (PES) level or the MPEG-2 
Transport Stream (TS) level.  Currently, the preferred option is 
scrambling at the TS level.  When a CA service is included, the 
architecture is modified as shown in Fig. 1.  The CA system 
resides between the multiplexer and the modulator.  The 
multiplexer (Mux) now combines the EMMs and ECMs along 
with the video, audio and data into a single DVB transport 
stream.  The modulator takes the scrambled signal and 
modulates it for transmission to the satellite.  The CA system is 
composed of several specific modules:  
• The Smart Card Processing System:  contains 
information about the secret information stored into 
consumer smart cards or set-top boxes, including in 
particular each Smart Card’s secret key. This 
module is sometimes integrated in the SAS.  
• The Subscriber Authorization System (SAS):  
processes the different viewing authorisations given 
to the subscribers and uses them to generate 
adequate EMMs and ECMs.  The SAS also 
generates the service key, transmitted in the EMMs. 
• The Control Word Generator: creates the Control 
Words. 
• Two encryption engines (often implemented by the 
same software): used to encrypt the service key 
transmitted in the EMMs, and the Control Words 
transmitted in the ECMs.  
• The scrambler:  scrambles the payload of the 
packets composing the transport stream, using the 
Control Word. The scrambler usually scrambles the 
packets containing the picture and audio 
information and sometimes some packets 
containing data.  Packets containing EMMs and 
ECMs are not scrambled.  The preferred 
implementation of the scrambler is in the 
multiplexer device.  Stand-alone scramblers also 
exist. 
In addition, the Conditional Access system interacts with the 
Subscriber Management System (SMS) that holds all the data 
related to subscribers, running subscriptions and payments. 
SMS in turn interacts with the Billing and Customer Care 
system to generate revenues. The SMS tells which programmes 
subscribers are authorised (entitled) to view.  
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Fig. 1  General architecture for Conditional Access system (scrambling) 
B. Data descrambling in DVB-S 
At the receiving end, the set-top box descrambles the 
programme streams and decodes the MPEG-2 data for viewing 
as shown in Fig. 2.  The tuner portion of the set-top box 
receives the incoming signal, demodulates it and sends the 
resulting data to the transport stream generator.  This 
reconstitutes the transport stream, which is passed to the 
MPEG-2 decoder.  
Fig. 2 also shows the DVB descrambling system.  However, 
it should be noted that the DVB standards do not specify the 
smart-card electronics or algorithms, and therefore the system 
described here is simply a typical example.  The encrypted 
session key, or Control Word, carried by the ECM, is related to 
particular programme material.  This key allows the transport 
stream to be descrambled so that the viewer can see a particular 
programme or view the programme material for a particular 
session.  As Fig. 2 shows, the service key (transmitted in the 
EMM) is sent to the smart card, where it is decrypted using the 
Smart Card key.  The decrypted service key is then used as the 
key to decrypt the session key or Control Word (transmitted in 
the ECM).  It is this CW that is the key for the DVB transport-
stream descrambler. 
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Fig. 2  DVB descrambling in a typical set-top box 
C. Weaknesses of DVB Conditional Access 
The DVB specification specifies the algorithm to use to 
scramble a DVB stream: it is called the DVB Common 
Scrambling Algorithm (DVB-CSA).  This algorithm is 
standardised but is not public [11].  Technical details of the 
scrambling algorithm are only made available to bona-fide 
users upon signature of a Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA) 
administered by the Custodian (ETSI).  Having a non-public 
security algorithm does not inspire confidence because any 
weaknesses in the system cannot be scrutinised publicly.  This 
compares with the current activities in IPSEC and the Internet 
community, which are all focused on open algorithms that have 
been in the public domain for many years.  It is our view that 
the same principle should apply to future versions of DVB-
CSA and other future DVB security systems. 
In addition to the open system issues, let us analyse the 
weaknesses of the existing DVB CA system.  The following is 
a summary of the CA system procedures: 
1. An EMM containing a new service key is encrypted 
with the Smart Card (SC) secret key.  Each SC key 
is unique, and so EMMs are effectively unicast (not 
broadcast) to each receiver.  The CAT table 
contains the PID of the signalling message that 
contains the EMM.  The EMM’s service key is 
changed infrequently (e.g. every few months). 
2. An ECM containing a new session key / CW is 
encrypted with the service key sent in an EMM.  
The PMT table contains the PID of the signalling 
message that contains the ECM.  The ECM’s 
session key / CW changes every few seconds. 
3. Each video and audio stream is scrambled with the 
Control Word (CW).  
4. If the consumer fails to pay their subscription, then 
a special EMM message is sent to that SC to 
disable it. 
Examination of the above procedures shows that the 
fundamental weakness of DVB CA system is the reliance on an 
unchanging permanent key in the smart card.  Specifically, 
attackers can have access if they manage to break the key of a 
single legitimate smart card.  This is the reason for the fraud 
and the spread of counterfeit smart cards mentioned earlier. 
Another fundamental weakness is the broadcast nature of the 
system with no feedback mechanism to exercise control except 
subscription payments.  In other words, there is no way of 
knowing how many copies of a legitimate smart card are there 
in operation.  Some operators have started using telephone 
lines as an ad hoc feedback mechanism. 
In summary, it is very difficult to stop fraudulent cloning of 
smart cards in a one-way (broadcast only) DVB system without 
a return channel and/or an efficient way to update smart card 
keys.  Therefore DVB CA is in need of a major upgrade and 
new design. 
 
III. IP LAYER SOLUTION FOR MULTICASTING OVER SATELLTE 
In this paper, we propose an IP layer multicast security 
solution as an alternative to the DVB-S CA system.  In this 
solution, we use a group key management protocol call Group 
Secure Association Key Management Protocol (GSAKMP). 
GSAKMP is one of the standard key management solutions in 
the IETF MSEC working group [7].   
This system can be used for secure satellite broadcasting 
services (securing MPEG streams in TV programmes and 
Internet multimedia streams).  However the easy interworking 
with IPSEC makes the satellite security system more integrated 
with terrestrial Internet, where IPSEC is becoming widely 
available in routers and end systems such as Linux and 
Windows based workstation. 
The principal actors in multicast key management are the 
group controller (GC) and group members (GMs).  The former 
is responsible for creating and distributing keys and rekeying 
(to maintain security) as appropriate; the group members are 
entities with access to the group keys.  The GC need not be co-
located with the multicast data source. The life cycle of a 
GSAKMP group secure association can be divided into three 
phases: Group establishment, maintenance and group removal, 
as shown in Fig. 3 the left side of the diagram represents the 
actions of the GC, and the right side of the diagram represents 
the actions of the GMs. 
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Fig. 3  GSAKMP message exchange 
 
The multicast group may need to be rekeyed for any of a 
number of reasons: 
 (1) The group key is usually updated regularly (typically every 
few seconds or minutes) to reduce the probability of 
successful cryptanalysis of the encrypted traffic. 
(2) The group key may also need to be changed on demand if 
it is determined that the key has been compromised. 
(3) Rekeying may be required when a new member joins the 
multicast group.  This ensures that the member cannot 
decrypt encoded traffic sent prior to their joining 
(backward secrecy). 
(4) Rekeying may be required when an existing member 
departs from the multicast group.  This ensures that the 
member cannot decrypt encoded traffic sent after they 
leave (forward secrecy). 
For large multicast groups that have frequent membership 
changes the cost of rekeying can be significant, since satellite 
resources are expensive.  Scalable rekeying is therefore an 
important problem that needs to be considered in order to 
support secure communications for large dynamic groups.  We 
now consider rekey techniques for each of the four functions 
listed above. 
Several techniques exist for rekeying (1) and (3) above: two 
options are for the new group key to be encrypted with either 
(a) the old group key, or (b) a separate “control” key negotiated 
during session establishment.  For (2) and (4) above a different 
rekeying approach is required since the old key is known by at 
least one user who is no longer to be a recipient of the 
multicast transmission.  We now consider options for this 
rekeying. 
A number of multicast key management approaches have 
been developed with the objective of improving the scalability 
of group secure associations, by ensuring that parameters grow 
more slowly than the group size, N.  Parameters considered 
include group controller encryption effort, memory 
requirements, network traffic, and group members’ decryption 
effort and memory requirements.  
For large multicast groups (which can be the case for 
satellite services) a scalable key distribution and rekeying is 
essential.  In this paper, we have adopted the Logical Key 
Hierarchy (LKH) solution as presented in RFC 2627 [7]. LKH 
uses a set of keys arranged in a tree structure to reduce the cost 
of rekeying (Fig. 4).   
For a tree of outdegree k and depth d, the number of rekeys 
transmitted on a member compromise is reduced from 
dkN =
 (for a flat system) to 1log −Nk k .  The system is 
also robust against collusion, in that no set of users together 
can read any message unless one of them could have read it 
individually.   
A tree of keys is used to share a single key ‘O’ so that it is 
known to the GC and all GMs but to no other entities.  In Fig. 
4 the keys are labelled A through O, the circles again represent 
the pairwise keys, and the lines each represent encrypted keys 
sent across the network, as we shall now see.  Suppose now 
that User 11 needs to be deleted from the multicast group.  
Then all of the keys held by User 11 (keys F, K, N, O) must be 
changed and distributed to the users who need them, without 
permitting User 11 to obtain them or anyone else who is not 
entitled to them.  To do this, we must replace the keys held by 
User 11, proceeding from the bottom up. The seven keys sent 
represent a significant saving on the 16 keys that would need to 
be transmitted using the flat key system.  We briefly write these 
keys as {F}12 {K}E {K}F {N}K {N}L {O}M {O}N.  In 
general, the number of transmissions required is the sum of the 
degrees of the replaced nodes. In a k-ary tree of depth d, this is 
a total of 1log1 −=− Nkkd k  transmissions. 
GSAKMP and LKH can work with IPSEC by passing the 
key and the associated Security Parameter Index (SPI) that are 
received in the GSAKMP client (on the end system) to the 
IPSEC engine [7].  IPSEC can be used to secure multicast 
traffic as long as the SPI is uniquely identified. 
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Fig. 4  Logical Key Hierarchy and flat key architectures 
 
As an alternative to the DVB conditional access, let us 
consider the following scenario: A subscription based satellite 
broadcasting service can offer TV programmes such as movie 
and sports services as two separate secure multicast groups.  
All customers that subscribe to the movie service will be 
managed by the GSAKMP group controller and the movie 
decryption key will be distributed using LKH tree architecture.  
When a subscriber leaves this services, a new 
encryption/decryption key will be distributed through the same 
satellite multicast channel (for the movie service) to all 
remaining member except the leaving subscriber.  The 
necessary LKH keys can distributed in a single multicast 
message as described in section 5.  So the overheads of 
rekeying are low. 
Within this research work the GSAKMP and LKH systems 
were developed and tested.  Fig. 5 shows a comparison of LKH 
and flat key performance when rekeying is need to exclude one 
user from a large multicast group. The rekeying with LKH is a 
logarithmic function ( 1log −Nk k ) and Fig. 6 is an 
enlargement of the graph (the area near the origin) in Fig. 5 to 
show the logarithmic effect.  LKH has a good  scalability in the 
presence of the large number of multicast users. For example if 
there are 2048 members in a multicast group in a flat key 
architecture 2047 rekey messages are need to exclude a single 
user.  In contact, using LKH only 21 rekey messages are 
needed (as shown in Fig. 5). 
 
  
Fig. 5  Comparison of LKH with flat key architectures – large scale 
 
 
Fig. 6  Comparison of LKH with flat key architectures – small scale 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Many satellite service providers are now looking to expand 
their TV broadcast service offerings to include Internet 
services, making use of DVB standards.  A key issue for the 
future success of these DVB systems is thus security.  This 
paper has reviewed the DVB-S Conditional Access system and 
exposed its major weakness, namely one-way broadcasting 
system with no effective feedback channel to control fraud and 
misuse.  An alternative solution is proposed to secure 
distributions (such as TV multicasting) using LKH and 
GSAKMP.   
This solution avoids the current fraud problems related to 
DVB smart cards, which has an inherent weakness because the 
smart cards play an active role in decrypting the DVB 
broadcasts.  The role of smart cards should be confined to 
subscriber authentication and storing the lowest level keys in 
LKH system.  In this way, breaking a smart card keys will only 
affect that subscriber and not the whole broadcasting service.  
The compromised subscribers can be easily removed from the 
broadcast (multicast) service by a single LKH rekeying 
message by the GSAKMP group controller.  
The GSAKMP and LKH systems had been implemented and 
the test result shows the good scalability of this system for 
large and dynamic multicast groups. 
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